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In this Essay, I will address the challenges related to antitrust remedies
in high technology industries. Notably, a concern raised by Judge Posner,
among others, is that antitrust courts are not well situated to oversee
behavior in dynamic industries.1 As discussed below, I remain convinced
that antitrust law is adaptable and antitrust doctrine can continue to
develop to meet new challenges. Part of the adaptability of our antitrust
system is the role of states—and State Attorneys General (AGs) in
particular—and I will discuss this issue before proceeding to address how
antitrust doctrine and remedies can adapt to the challenges of overseeing
internet platforms and technology markets.
I. THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
During the 1970s, Congress began to develop a range of “cooperative
federalism” regulatory programs. Under such programs, Congress
authorizes state enforcement of federal law and generally calls on the
federal government to set a floor for enforcement. In so doing, it generally
provides states with additional authority to tailor standards as well as pick
up any slack in enforcement. By instituting such a model, Congress
* Colorado Attorney General; Hatfield Professor of Law, University of Colorado (on leave).
Thanks to Jeff Blattner, Diane Hazel, Steve Kaufmann, Doug Melamed, and Jonathan Sallet for
helpful comments and encouragement. I appreciate Adam Rice’s and Lauren Knudson’s careful
research assistance and support on this essay. This essay was originally intended to be presented as
the keynote speech at the 20th Annual Loyola Antitrust Colloquium on Friday, April 17, 2020.
However, this event was canceled due to COVID-19, but a brief summary of these remarks was
provided virtually on that date.
1. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 925 (2001)
(“The real problem [facing antitrust law] lies on the institutional side: the enforcement agencies
and the courts do not have adequate technical resources, and do not move fast enough, to cope
effectively with a very complex business sector that changes very rapidly.”).
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adopted a hedging strategy—ensuring a base level of uniformity,
allowing for appropriate experimentation, and building in the opportunity
to pick up the slack as to any underenforcement at the federal level.2
The environmental laws provide the classic example of cooperative
federalism in action, with the Clean Air Act being a clear case in point.3
Under the Clean Air Act’s model, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) authorizes state agencies to address air pollution using a variety of
tools, provided that they ensure a basic level of air quality. Where state
agencies decide to go above the level specified by the EPA, they are
permitted to do so.4 Following this precedent, both telecommunications
regulation and health care policy later adopted a cooperative federalism
architecture, blending state and federal authority and calling on state
agencies to develop and enforce federal regulatory standards.
Antitrust law operates in a functionally similar manner to other
cooperative federalism regimes. In 1976, by adopting the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Congress embraced the ability of
state AGs to enforce federal antitrust law on behalf of their states, using
what is called “parens patriae” authority.5 The theory of this delegation
of authority, like other cooperative federalism programs, is twofold: (1)
states may be better positioned to know of competitive issues in their
jurisdictions; and (2) states may have a greater willingness to take action
and have the ability to collect damages on behalf of their citizens, thereby
further advancing the goals of antitrust law. As the Supreme Court stated,
the role of states in antitrust enforcement “was in no sense an
afterthought; it was an integral part of the congressional plan for
protecting competition.”6
One of the questions inherent in a cooperative federalism framework
is whether the federal government has the authority to prevent states from
going further than the federal government where, in their view, local
conditions warrant. In the environmental arena, the EPA has the authority
2. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79
N.C. L. REV. 663, 663 (2001) (highlighting how Congress favors cooperative federalism programs
that combine federal and state authority in creative ways and recognizing the value of state implementation of cooperative federalism statutes).
3. Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q; see Weiser, supra note 2, at 670 (“In the
case of the Clean Air Act, for example, the statute provided for certain uniform federal standards,
but left the states with considerable flexibility in addressing the statute’s objectives.”).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 7416.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 15c; see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 600 (1982) (“Parens patriae means literally ‘parent of the country.’”); Margaret S. Thomas,
Parens Patriae and the States’ Historic Police Power, 69 SMU L. REV. 759, 761 (2016) (“[Parens
patriae suits are] civil suits brought by state attorneys general against mass tortfeasors for injuries
to the states’ citizenry.”).
6. California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 284 (1990).
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to ensure a minimum level of enforcement, but not to prevent states from
taking additional action. In the antitrust arena, the situation is similar: the
federal government can take action to ensure a basic level of enforcement,
but it does not have the power to prevent states from going further—under
federal or state law—to stop anticompetitive conduct.7
For an example of parallel federal and state action, consider the
Microsoft case.8 In that case, the federal government ultimately
decided—after a remand on the remedies issue by the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia—on a regulatory remedy and
declined to pursue structural relief. A number of states that were part of
this litigation took a different view and proceeded to challenge the
absence of divestiture. As this case was litigated and ultimately decided,
it was accepted that the states have the requisite authority to pursue a
different view from the federal government if they choose to do so.9
The opposite approach—empowering the federal government to bar
states from antitrust enforcement whenever it so chooses—would
undermine the architecture of cooperative federalism. Such an approach
would also hurt consumers in states where state AGs pick up the slack in
federal enforcement by bringing additional resources to bear and by
applying their local expertise. Consider, for example, the case of a recent
merger in Colorado Springs between DaVita’s clinical network and
UnitedHealth Group’s Medicare Advantage insurance product.10 In this
case, UnitedHealth consummated the merger after its market share
declined from around 75% to around 50% as a result of the emergence of
a disruptive entrant, Humana. Humana emerged as a rival after building
its relationship with DaVita’s clinics, which referred patients to
Humana’s Medicare Advantage offering. In the wake of the merger,
however, Humana faced the prospect of losing access to referrals for its
7. I should note that, in discussing going further, I am referring to the development of federal
antitrust law through action by state officials. There is the entirely separate matter of state antitrust
law, which can differ from federal law as states adopt different standards, whether through case
law or legislation. The adoption of “Illinois Brick repealer” statutes or judicial decisions in several
states is an instructive case in point. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Illinois Brick, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2115, 2119 (2015) (“Thirty-five states have rejected
the doctrine, permitting antitrust enforcement by indirect purchasers under their state antitrust
laws.”).
8. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45–47 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
9. See New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The states which
opted not to join the settlement between the United States and Microsoft have proposed a remedy
distinct from that presented in the proposed consent decree.”).
10. Complaint at 3, Colorado ex rel. Weiser v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. 2019CV31424
(Colo. Dist. Ct. June 19, 2019) (“UnitedHealth Group Incorporated entered into an equity purchase
agreement to acquire DaVita Medical Group for approximately $4.9 billion in cash.”).
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Medicare Advantage product from patients at DaVita’s clinics.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reviewed the
UnitedHealth/DaVita merger and declined to take action in the Colorado
Springs market.11 In Colorado, however, the Attorney General’s office
was concerned about the prospect of UnitedHealth using control over
DaVita’s clinics to reestablish its dominant position in the Medicare
Advantage market—thereby leading to higher prices, less choice, and
lower quality offerings to patients. By taking action in this case, separate
and apart from the FTC, we were able to protect Colorado consumers.
And rather than protest our action, the FTC respected our authority.
Indeed, two commissioners wrote separately to highlight the valuable role
state AGs play in enforcing antitrust law.12
Unfortunately, federal antitrust authorities don’t always show respect
for state antitrust enforcement. In late 2019, for example, the Department
of Justice (DOJ) filed a brief taking an unfortunate and unjustified
position in the Sprint/T-Mobile merger.13 In particular, the DOJ asserted
in its brief that the states’ “[quasi-sovereign] role does not permit states
to override the sovereign interests of the United States.”14 In essence, the
DOJ argued that the DOJ itself is the supreme arbiter of antitrust law. On
the DOJ’s view, once it takes a position on a matter, the states are
foreclosed from any enforcement that would be contrary to the selected
path of the federal agency.15 That view runs contrary to what Congress
11. UnitedHealth Group and DaVita; Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid
Public Comment, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,114, 30,118 (June 26, 2019).
12. In re UnitedHealth Group and DaVita, No. 181-0057 (F.T.C. June 19, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1529359/181_0057
_united_davita_statement_of_cmmrs_s_and_c.pdf [https://perma.cc/JLT5-Y68R] (Statement of
Commissioners Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Rohit Chopra).
13. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 25, New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG,
439 F. Supp. 3d 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 1:19-cv-5434-VM-RWL), (“The Litigating States’
strong interest in this merger does not justify their attempt to substitute their judgment for the nationwide perspective of the United States.”).
14. Id. at 24. Colorado had earlier dropped out of that litigation in favor of a settlement that
benefited Coloradans, so our office was not involved in the litigation itself. Attorney General’s
Office Secures 2,000 Jobs, Statewide 5G Network Deployment Under Agreements with Dish, TMobile, COLO. ATT’Y GEN. (Oct. 21, 2019), https://coag.gov/press-releases/attorney-generals-office-secures-2000-jobs-statewide-5g-network-deployment-under-agreements-with-dish-t-mobile10-21-19/ [https://perma.cc/UVA2-P77D].
15. Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 13, at 25. Famously, Judge Posner has
called for an end to state attorneys general enforcement of the antitrust laws, calling into question
their institutional competence to manage such litigation other than free riding on the federal government’s efforts. See Posner, supra note 1, at 940 (“I would like to see, first, the states stripped of
their authority to bring antitrust suits, federal or state, except under circumstances in which a private
firm would be able to sue, as where the state is suing firms that are fixing the prices of goods or
services that they sell to the state.”); see also Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement
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intended in framing broad enforcement of the antitrust laws that
recognizes the critical role of the states.16 Because this position would
upend forty-five years of antitrust practice and jurisprudence, the
litigating states properly responded that the “[s]tates are independent
enforcers of the antitrust laws, and it is the role of the Court—not any
federal agency—to decide the lawfulness of the merger.”17
The DOJ’s flawed argument in the T-Mobile case was based on the
dissenting opinion in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.18 Notably,
the majority in that case held that states are authorized to seek injunctive
relief under the antitrust laws. Moreover, the DOJ’s suggestion—that the
DOJ and FCC (Federal Communications Commission) merger review in
the T-Mobile case is exclusive and preclusive—contradicts Congress’
empowerment of state AGs and is a dangerous idea as well. Under the
DOJ’s theory, if a federal antitrust agency approves a merger, antitrust
enforcement against the merger would be precluded as long as the merger
was subject to review and approval by the federal agency. That would
diminish antitrust enforcement and would, in effect, permit the federal
of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 13 (2004) (“I am even
more convinced that Congress should repeal the provision of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act that authorizes parens patriae antitrust suits by the states”). Congress has failed to act on this suggestion
and, as Harry First has explained, Posner’s depiction of the role of state AGs litigation is unfair and
misstated. See Harry First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of States in Antitrust Enforcement, 69
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1004, 1005 (2001) (“An examination of Posner’s arguments, however, shows
that his policy prescription is extreme and his supporting arguments are weak, if not mean-spirited.”).
16. See Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 375 (1983)
(“The legislative history of the federal antitrust law indicates that Congress intended to leave state
antitrust enforcement more or less intact but to provide an additional federal forum for dealing with
restraints of trade which exceeded the jurisdiction of the courts of any particular state.”).
17. Plaintiffs’ Response to Statement of Interest of the United States, New York v. Deutsche
Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 1:19-cv-5434-VM-RWL); see also Letter
from Bob Ferguson, Att’y Gen. of Wash., to Hon. Victor Marrero, J. S.D.N.Y (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.517350/gov.uscourts.nysd.517350.372.0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NE6AVKZQ] (“States—and, for that matter, private parties—have every right to bring a merger challenge that the evidence and the law warrants, regardless of the position of the federal enforcers, or
whether the markets are national or local.”). This argument was also developed in the filing by the
States on the draft Vertical Merger Guidelines. See U.S. Dep’t of Just. & F.T.C., Public Comments
of 28 State Attorneys General on Draft Vertical Merger Guidelines (Feb. 26, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1258786/download [https://perma.cc/7EYG-QJZU] (“Many
states have their own merger statutes, often patterned after federal antitrust laws. Moreover, State
Attorneys General working together can bolster antitrust enforcement across the nation by effectively deploying expertise and resources.”); Jay L. Himes, Exploring the Antitrust Operating System: State Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Law in the Remedies Phase of the Microsoft Case, 11
GEO. MASON L. REV. 37, 46 (2002) (“[T]he fact that federal enforcers take a particular course of
action in response to a particular set of facts—or take no action at all—does not preclude action by
state enforcers under either federal or state law.”).
18. Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 468–90 (1945) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
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antitrust agencies to extinguish the rights of states and private parties to
enforce and seek remedies for harm caused by violations of antitrust laws.
The DOJ’s rationale in the T-Mobile case would also justify exempting
transactions from antitrust review because a federal regulatory agency
approved such a matter. Notably, the DOJ invoked the FCC’s regulatory
action in that case as a basis for stripping states of authority to challenge
the merger. This is a dangerous claim and goes flatly against federal
merger law, which has consistently refused to reject antitrust claims for
non-antitrust reasons since the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in
Philadelphia National Bank.19
In a later speech, DOJ Antitrust Division Chief Makan Delrahim
defended the DOJ’s position.20 He argued that allowing states to bring
antitrust actions of their own “creates the risk that a small subset of states,
or even perhaps just one, could undermine beneficial transactions and
settlements nationwide.”21 Moreover, he suggested that states should not
be authorized to seek any “relief that is incompatible with relief secured
by the federal government.”22 This concept of federal supremacy is
incorrect and ignores the fact that states can enforce the federal antitrust
laws only by bringing cases in federal court. If states advance claims that
are unfounded and would undermine procompetitive mergers, the courts
will reject them. And the courts can, of course, take into account any
action or decision by the federal antitrust agencies in assessing a state’s
claims, just as the Court in Philadelphia National Bank took into account
the actions of federal bank regulatory agencies.23 But there is no basis in
the statutes, the cases, or sound policy for a decision by a federal agency
to preclude the states from exercising their rights under the antitrust laws
by asking a federal court to prevent or provide remedies for a violation of
those laws.
Although the court ruled against the states in the T-Mobile case, Judge
Marrero declined to adopt Delrahim’s proposed limit on the states’ role.
Rather than reject the states’ authority to bring the action, the court
19. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (“[A merger whose effect]
‘may be substantially to lessen competition’ is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of
social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.”).
20. See Makan Delrahim, Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at Media Institute
Luncheon, “Getting Better”: Progress and Remaining Challenges in Merger Review (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarksmedia-institute-luncheon [https://perma.cc/4CTW-4DHK] (“Permitting states to undermine federal
enforcement also would be contrary to congressional intent.”).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 361–62 (“We are helped to this conclusion by the fact
that the three federal banking agencies regard the area in which banks have their offices as an ‘area
of effective competition.’”).
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evaluated the case on the merits, noting that the views of federal
regulators can be informative, but are not conclusive.24 To be sure, the
presence of a remedy—a fix to the harm occasioned by the merger, as it
were—is a fact of life that the litigating states and the court rightly had to
address. Similarly, the DOJ would also need to “litigate the fix” if another
federal regulatory agency (say, the FCC) adopted a remedy in the face of
a DOJ merger challenge. But to face challenges in litigation is a far cry
from being barred from the courtroom.
In short, the states are partners in antitrust enforcement, reflecting the
cooperative federalism architecture adopted by Congress. In effect,
Congress has empowered states to act as a check on federal enforcement,
or, more precisely, on instances of federal underenforcement; as such, it
declined to allow federal inaction or preference for particular remedies to
remove the states from antitrust enforcement. In this sense, the central
question is not—as the DOJ suggests—whether states might “displace
the federal government’s role as the nation’s federal antitrust enforcer,”25
but rather whether states are positioned to pick up any slack and ensure
that important issues are raised before the courts, whether or not the
federal agencies are inclined or able to do so.26
II. THE STATE OF ANTITRUST LAW AS TO DOMINANT PLATFORMS
For both state and federal enforcers, the rise of dominant internet
platforms raises an important challenge for antitrust oversight. In
particular, enforcers must address the concern that dominant platforms
are able to exclude upstart, or nascent, rivals before those firms can
emerge as competitive threats.27 In some cases, the concern is that
dominant firms can acquire such upstarts while they are still developing.

24. See New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 224–26, 225 n.21 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (“Having been tasked with independently reviewing the legality of the Proposed Merger, the
Court is not bound by the conclusions of these regulatory agencies. Similarly, the Court does not
simply adopt their conclusions wholesale.”).
25. Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 13, at 25.
26. See Himes, supra note 17, at 63 (“Multiple enforcers stimulate not only antitrust enforcement, but also innovation in antitrust enforcement. . . . This multiplicity of antitrust enforcers, each
with varying incentives, also minimizes the opportunity for serious antitrust violations to avoid
detection.”); see also Robert L. Hubbard & James Yoon, How the Antitrust Modernization Commission Should View State Antitrust Enforcement, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 497, 506 (2005)
(“Antitrust federalism means that the market for antitrust enforcement, like the markets to which
antitrust laws apply, is ruled by competition, and that competition among antitrust enforcers and
bodies of law fosters alternative, choice, innovation, and insight.”).
27. In short, a platform is a product or service that provides a standard that consumers rely on
and allow applications providers to interface with. The concept of a platform, and the competitive
dynamics raised by platforms, is discussed in Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534 (2003).
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In others, the concern is that the firm will respond to an upstart rival with
actions that protect its dominance—say, exclusive dealing, tying, loyalty
rebates, and most favored nation provisions.28 Under either concern,
dominant firms can undermine these upstart and nascent competitors to
protect their positions in the market. An expert report commissioned by
the United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority recently
emphasized the importance of ensuring that upstarts have a fair
opportunity to compete and challenge incumbent firms: “It is the threat
of being overtaken by rivals that provides the spur to companies to
innovate and produce new products that consumers want.”29
In the wake of the Chicago School revolution, a number of
commentators—myself included—have explained that antitrust doctrine
has, on occasion, mistakenly bent over backward to avoid false positives,
effectively ignoring false negatives.30 Consider, for example, predatory
pricing cases where courts have excused dominant airlines’ actions
focused on excluding a rival.31 The American Airlines case is a notable
illustration of this dynamic. In that case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a
summary judgment ruling in favor of American Airlines on the ground
that the government had not demonstrated pricing of airplane flights
below marginal cost.32 With the benefit of hindsight on this case (as well
as higher prices and more concentration in the airline industry), however,
the failure to focus more on the costs of false negatives bears close
attention.33
28. For a good discussion of both sets of concerns, see generally Giulio Federico, Fiona Scott
Morton & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting Disruption (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26005, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3412680
[https://perma.cc/795J-XCQA].
29. COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., ONLINE PLATFORMS AND DIGITAL ADVERTISING:
MARKET STUDY INTERIM REPORT 8 (2019),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5dfa0580ed915d0933009761/Interim_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8EVQ-WTC2]. That same report importantly acknowledges that “[w]here a platform has gained a large market share by being consistently better than its competitors and where it
must respond to continued competitive pressures to maintain that position, it may be considered to
operate within a competitive market even with a large market share.” Id. at 10–11.
30. For the classic defense of the Chicago School approach, see generally Frank H. Easterbrook,
The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984). For a modern critique of this view, see generally
JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM (2019).
31. Scott Hemphill and I discuss the failings of this area of the law. See C. Scott Hemphill &
Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Brooke Group: Bringing Reality to the Law of Predatory Pricing, 127
YALE L.J. 2048, 2067 (2018) (“[A] predator could recoup its investment in below-cost prices even
if supracompetitive pricing in the market in which the predation occurred did not suffice to recover
investment. A second recoupment strategy is to exploit imperfections in capital markets to deny
financing to the rival.”).
32. United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1111 (10th Cir. 2003).
33. For more discussion of how antitrust law should approach “false positives” versus “false
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With an appreciation of the risk of underenforcement, we can examine
critically two potential limits in the reach of monopolization law. First,
courts must consider whether enforcers must demonstrate consumer harm
as a specific element of Section 2 of the Sherman Act violations (in
addition to the standard requirement to demonstrate monopoly power and
a predatory act).34 In some cases, courts have suggested such a showing
is necessary, whereas others have made plain that demonstrating harm to
the competitive process (including to nascent rivals) suffices.35
Second, since the Trinko case, courts have evaluated whether a change
in a prior course of dealing is sufficient to give rise to antitrust liability.
In Trinko, the Supreme Court declined to overrule the Aspen Skiing
decision and the duty to deal doctrine, but it did suggest that Aspen
Skiing’s holding lay at the outer limits of antitrust liability.36 In Aspen
Skiing, the decision of a firm that owned three mountains to refuse to
continue cooperating with a firm that owned one mountain through a
four-mountain pass was the basis of antitrust liability for
monopolization.37 As Judge Posner later put it, Aspen Skiing can be
viewed as justifying antitrust liability where “cooperation is
indispensable to effective competition.”38 Despite Trinko’s skepticism,
the duty to deal doctrine set out in Aspen Skiing continues to have
vitality.39
The Chicago School project continues to perform an important role in
calling for greater economic rigor in antitrust analysis. But the trend to
downplay or overlook false negatives is a dangerous one. Going forward,
I would like to see a greater reexamination of efforts to limit antitrust
negatives,” see generally Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis:
What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2015).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”); see
also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595–97 (1985) (discussing
the two elements of the offense of monopolization as defined by the Sherman Act).
35. Compare Energy Conversion Devices Liquidation Tr. v. Trina Solar Ltd., 833 F.3d 680,
685 (6th Cir. 2016) (“It does not suffice for a plaintiff to allege only that ‘the defendant has tried
to knock out other businesses’; the plaintiff must show that ‘the means it has employed to that end
are likely to . . . injure consumers.’”) (citations omitted) with United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (“[I]t would be inimical to the purpose of the
Sherman Act to allow monopolists free reign to squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at
will.”).
36. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004).
37. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 610–11.
38. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986).
39. See, e.g., Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 454–60 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding
that advertising representative made out a plausible claim against cable company Comcast, which
provided its own advertising representation services, on a refusal to deal theory of monopolization).
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liability (as in the predatory pricing example) rather than to further
restrict it (as in the case of the duty to deal doctrine or requiring specific
proof of consumer harm).
III. REFLECTIONS ON ANTITRUST REMEDIES AS TO DIGITAL PLATFORMS
One of the great challenges for antitrust in the twenty-first century is
to develop remedies to oversee digital platforms. On that front, in contrast
to substantive antitrust doctrine, too little scholarly analysis informs how
to approach antitrust remedies.40 In this Part, I will focus on three broad
categories of remedies that, among others, merit further discussion and
analysis. Specifically, with regard to enabling rivals to have access and
interoperability with dominant digital platforms in high technology
industries, potential remedies include (1) relying on a regulatory agency,
(2) identifying a prior course of dealing as a benchmark, or (3)
establishing a set of requirements to be overseen by an antitrust court or
other entity.
Courts and enforcers clearly need to devote more analysis to how to
approach remedies. In the Microsoft case, for example, the district court
decided on a structural remedy without undertaking a hearing or much
analysis.41 In response, the DC Circuit remanded this issue for more
careful consideration, leading to the ultimate regulatory requirements
overseen by the district court.42
One important starting principle for analysis of remedies should be
comparative institutional competence. When, for example, a court has the
option of adopting different potential remedies, it will need to conclude
which option is best. With the Microsoft case almost certainly in mind,
Judge Posner explained some of the challenges related to antitrust
remedies.43 In that sense, Judge Posner might be seen as calling for
humility in devising remedies of a court’s own making.
In the AT&T case, Judge Greene opted for a belt-and-suspenders
strategy, empowering both the FCC and the district court to oversee the

40. To be sure, there are notable exceptions. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak,
Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 75 (2001) (examining remedies—
particularly divestiture—in network monopolization cases).
41. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated,
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
42. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 105–06 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. Microsoft
Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
43. Posner, supra note 1, at 936–40 (discussing the administrative difficulties enforcement
agencies and the courts face due to a lack of adequate technical resources and limited ability to act
quickly).
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antitrust remedies.44 In so doing, he went beyond the Otter Tail case,
where the court required the electric utility defendant to commit to
providing access to its network by filing a tariff deemed acceptable by
the Federal Power Commission.45 By contrast, Judge Greene was
unwilling to rely solely on the FCC, also imposing judicially enforceable
requirements that the Bell Companies could not discriminate “between
AT&T and other companies in their procurement activities, the
establishment of technical standards, the dissemination of technical
information, their use of Operating Company facilities and charges for
such use, and their network planning.”46 This requirement, along with
others that mandated equal access to Bell Company infrastructure, was
designed to be flexible and adaptable, allowing for ongoing waivers and
refinements.47 Indeed, nondiscrimination as a remedy requires careful
consideration in a variety of settings because it protects competition and
is manageable by judges.
Judge Greene’s adoption of a regulatory regime overseen by a district
court was controversial and ultimately ended with the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.48 Commentators differ on the
effectiveness of this model,49 but there is wide appreciation for the boon
to competition and innovation that resulted from the AT&T case. Less
commented on, however, is that Judge Greene faced a painful dilemma:
had he relied solely on the Otter Tail model, he would have lacked
confidence that the FCC would be able to effectively facilitate
competition. After all, Judge Greene heard powerful evidence in the
AT&T case that the FCC was unable to regulate AT&T previously and
was institutionally flawed.50
In some cases, where a firm changes the terms of dealing to create an
44. See generally United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 552 F. Supp. 131, 142 (D.D.C.
1982), vacated, United States v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 890 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995).
45. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1983).
46. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 142.
47. See id. at 197 (“[S]ince the Bell System network is both vast and complex, a variety of
approaches will in all probability be necessary to achieve equal access.” [and not] “Imposition by
the Court of a single procedure applicable to all areas and all interconnection requirements”).
48. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
49. See Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act:
Regulation Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1402 (1999) (discussing criticism and
defending Judge Greene).
50. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 168 (“Two former chiefs of the FCC’s Common Carrier Bureau, the
agency charged with regulating AT & T, testified that the Commission is not and never has been
capable of effective enforcement of the laws governing AT & T’s behavior.”); see also Philip J.
Weiser, Institutional Design, FCC Reform, and the Hidden Side of the Administrative State, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 675, 684 (2009) (discussing criticisms of FCC, including the depiction that its
acronym stands for “Forever Captured by Corporations”).
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advantage for itself over upstart rivals, courts can look to fashioning relief
based on a prior course of dealing where feasible. In the Aspen Skiing
case, for example, this was indeed the situation.51 As I stated elsewhere,
both cases grounded their remedies in “a prior course of dealing or some
benchmark that can provide a tractable guide as to what constitutes a
reasonable type of behavior.”52
In thinking about antitrust law, courts probably underappreciate the
impact of having a regulatory agency as a partner in overseeing remedies.
In both Otter Tail and AT&T, the courts were able to benefit from such a
partnership. In the Microsoft case, by contrast, the court was forced to
develop a regime of its own making. Until and unless a digital platforms
agency is established, courts in the internet platform arena are going to
be left with the model used in Microsoft as their best guide.
In addressing this challenge recently, the UK’s Competition and
Markets Authority touched on a potential innovation in this area. In
particular, that body suggested that “an enforceable code of conduct may
help address a number of concerns that we have identified in digital
advertising markets.”53 For American audiences, this model is likely less
familiar than it is to their European counterparts. To be sure, the Federal
Trade Commission has employed such a model successfully in the past,
such as in the case of false advertising claims, but what Europeans call
“co-regulation” is less familiar on this side of the Atlantic. In many
respects, the framework for such a model follows from the pathmarking
work of Ian Ayres and John Briathwaite’s Responsive Regulation,54
which envisions a more dynamic and adaptive model of regulatory
oversight than traditional command-and-control regulation.55
CONCLUSION
Antitrust law, over its 130 years, has proved to be an adaptive tool. A
critical element of our antitrust regime is state enforcement of the
antitrust laws. When Congress empowered State AGs to enforce antitrust
law, it adopted a cooperative federalism regime to allow experimentation,
tailoring, and redundancy in our antitrust enforcement. In practice, this
means that the federal government should not and cannot disregard the
51. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 598 n. 23 (1985).
52. Philip J. Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, Microsoft, and Beyond,
76 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 295 (2009).
53. COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., supra note 29, at 22.
54. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
55. I discuss this model in Philip J. Weiser, Entrepreneurial Administration, 97 B.U. L. REV.
2011 (2017).
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role of the states in antitrust enforcement.
In the years ahead, both state and federal antitrust enforcers will
continue to confront the challenges of a more dynamic economy and one
in which there is increasing market concentration. Given the level of
market concentration, we should reconsider carefully antitrust doctrines
that put a thumb on the scale against enforcement, indulging the highly
questionable assumption that false positives are a markedly bigger
concern than false negatives. We also should invest time and energy into
addressing the challenge of developing more effective models of
monitoring anticompetitive conduct. At least at this time, the absence of
any administrative agency oversight over technology markets means that
antitrust courts must act on their own—as was the case in Microsoft—and
without the benefit of an agency to fall back on for enforcement
support—as was the case in AT&T.

